The Universitas Indonesia in Jakarta-Depok is planning-developing a Resource Center for Sexuality Studies, with a Support Group. This initiative was denounced by Muhammad Nasir, minister of Research and Higher Education in the Jokowi Cabinet. He also added that he considered the initiative as a support for homosexuals and ´violators of the moral values of Indonesia´.
His call was followed by a rare common declaration of the major religions of Indonesia: Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI, the Conference of Catholic Bshops, KWI, the Buddhsts of Walubi and the High Council of Confucians in Indonesia. Majelis Tinggi Agama Khonghucu Indonesia or MATAKIN. No reason was given why the Protestants and Hindus were not part of this declaration (UCAN, 10-02-2016).
A critical voice in this debate was of Franz Magnis Suseno (UCAN, 18 February 2016). He stated that sexual orientation is something discovered by an individual person on the way to adulthood. This must be accepted and not discriminated because people are born in natural diversity. Most of them are attracted to the other sex, but if this is not the case, people should not be discriminated. Magnis Suseno rejects the idea of a blessing or legal possibility for a homosexual marriage. 'And it is not necessary because these couples will have no children. And marriage is for the legalisation of children. But how these homosexual couples act according to their own will and in private live, is not a matter for the state and other people.´
In Islamic Law there is a third category besides man and woman: the hermaphrodyte. In fiqh books they are mentioned as a status between man and woman. For Indonesia the word is waria, (a word combining wanita-pria). In the debate this concept is not mentioned until now.
A small house, called pondok-pesantren Al Fatah was opened in 2012 in Kotagede, Sayangan, under supervision/connectin to Nahdlatul Ulama, especially for transgenders. It became the focus for protests by FPI, Front Pembela Islam, but also for supporters of this initiative. Initially the local police defended the place, a private house on Joglo style, built in the 1800s for a family and donated for this purposem by the family of its director, Shints Ratri. The best known transgender is Maryani, who failed to make the hajj-pilgrimage in 2013. The following year she was successful to do it. She died in 2014. Notwithstanding the support of NU leaders, the police later withdraw the protection and closed the religious school on 25 February 2016 to defend 'public order' (it is located in a narrow street; at events many youngsters come and bloc the road with their motorbikes). - Will be continued.
zaterdag 27 februari 2016
woensdag 17 februari 2016
Postcolonial Comparisons
George-Henry Bousquet (1900-1978) is a famous scholar on Islam in North Africa, as well as on Al-Ghazali and sexual ethics. In the mid-1930s he made a comparative study of colonialisms, especially their policy towards Islam. The British were lazy and ignorant according to him: through indirect rule they allowed all kind of old traditions. Shari'a courts could continue as such, without interference. The Dutch were over-active. They had taken over the authority of most indigenous rulers and in the field of marriage and family law, as well as inheritance. They created but also controlled facilities for islamic courts. Snouck Hurgronje even started the practice to examine candidates for penghulu or high mosque officials who also presided the shari'a courts. The French were most perfect according to Bousquet: they imposed their own culture in public life. I have written elsewhere on this subject.
The director of KITLV since about a decade, Gert Oostindië was mostly known as a specialist in the Caribbean colonialism of the Netherlands, but he is now working more broadley, including Indonesia as well. Only recently I read his book of 2010: Postkoloniaal Nederland (Postcolonial Netherlands: a history of 65 years of forgetting, of memorial days and repression).
Oostindie included Portugal in the comparison, but as to Muslims there are very few from the former Protuguese colonies. France and Britain have large Muslim communities: in France from Algeria, Tunesia, West Africa. In the UK from Pakistan, India, East Africa and Nigeria. British migrants were much better educated than those who arrived from North and West Africa to France. This has for our generation made these Muslim communities quite different.
In the Netherlands Oostindië sees three major groups of migrants from Indonesia in the later 1940s and 1950s: Eurasians, Moluccans and Chinese. All three groups counted very few Muslims and therefore they are not the pillars for the Muslim community in the Netherlands. In the 1970s quite a few migrants came from Surinam: about one third of that colony (out of 500,000) opted for the European country. Among them were a quite strong group of Muslims who originally migrated from India to Surinam. There was also a smaller group of Muslims from Java who lived for about three generations and now form a small community in the Netherlands. But much larger groups of Muslims came after 1965 from Turkey and Morocco and therefore Dutch society considers Islam mostly as a Turkish and Moroccan religion.
Look at the green colour above: about one third of migrants to European countries is Muslim, but on the whole the number is only 6% and will rise probably to not much more than 8% in this generation.
Especially France has had a strong tradition of a secular society, laicité, not giving attention to religion as a cultural force and relating it to private sphere only. French society had a strong feeling of mission civilatrice, a cultural mission, without giving much attention to religion (pp. 213-6). In this way the colonial characteristic of Bousquet has been continued until now. The cruel attacks in Paris last year may have been partly caused by this strong secular sentiment in society.
In the United Kingdom there is still a feeling of Britishness and some continuation of pride: the colonial empire is still a reason of pride and glory for many British people and they resent that this glory has gone forever now. But instead, Britain itself has been turned into a multicultural society with a strong acceptance of differences between communities, as long as they do not interfere too much the other traditions. A national Commission on Integration & Cohesion published in 2007 a report on Our shared future and the colonial past was not even mentioned here. We should never exaggerate the burden of the past, surely not when it is once called the white man's burden!
The director of KITLV since about a decade, Gert Oostindië was mostly known as a specialist in the Caribbean colonialism of the Netherlands, but he is now working more broadley, including Indonesia as well. Only recently I read his book of 2010: Postkoloniaal Nederland (Postcolonial Netherlands: a history of 65 years of forgetting, of memorial days and repression).
Oostindie included Portugal in the comparison, but as to Muslims there are very few from the former Protuguese colonies. France and Britain have large Muslim communities: in France from Algeria, Tunesia, West Africa. In the UK from Pakistan, India, East Africa and Nigeria. British migrants were much better educated than those who arrived from North and West Africa to France. This has for our generation made these Muslim communities quite different.
In the Netherlands Oostindië sees three major groups of migrants from Indonesia in the later 1940s and 1950s: Eurasians, Moluccans and Chinese. All three groups counted very few Muslims and therefore they are not the pillars for the Muslim community in the Netherlands. In the 1970s quite a few migrants came from Surinam: about one third of that colony (out of 500,000) opted for the European country. Among them were a quite strong group of Muslims who originally migrated from India to Surinam. There was also a smaller group of Muslims from Java who lived for about three generations and now form a small community in the Netherlands. But much larger groups of Muslims came after 1965 from Turkey and Morocco and therefore Dutch society considers Islam mostly as a Turkish and Moroccan religion.
Look at the green colour above: about one third of migrants to European countries is Muslim, but on the whole the number is only 6% and will rise probably to not much more than 8% in this generation.
Especially France has had a strong tradition of a secular society, laicité, not giving attention to religion as a cultural force and relating it to private sphere only. French society had a strong feeling of mission civilatrice, a cultural mission, without giving much attention to religion (pp. 213-6). In this way the colonial characteristic of Bousquet has been continued until now. The cruel attacks in Paris last year may have been partly caused by this strong secular sentiment in society.
In the United Kingdom there is still a feeling of Britishness and some continuation of pride: the colonial empire is still a reason of pride and glory for many British people and they resent that this glory has gone forever now. But instead, Britain itself has been turned into a multicultural society with a strong acceptance of differences between communities, as long as they do not interfere too much the other traditions. A national Commission on Integration & Cohesion published in 2007 a report on Our shared future and the colonial past was not even mentioned here. We should never exaggerate the burden of the past, surely not when it is once called the white man's burden!
dinsdag 16 februari 2016
The seven plagues of Indonesia, according to Jaspert Slob
Living in Holland, retired from university, most of my contact with Indonesia is through historical documents. Nowadays it is often for writing for the great CMR project, Christian-Muslim Relations, a Bibliographical History. This is about Coen, Rumphius, Pieter van Dam and other VOC officials. But besides through personal contacts, there is daily news, reading the Jakarta Post and UCAN News in an Indonesian daily bulletin. Magazines like Hidup or the website Mirifica.com are not really important or people abroad. I read also once a month the blog by Lambertus Hurek, a journalist in Surabaya, originally from Lembata. He has much news about Flores, Catholics in Java, his contacts with Muslim society in Surabaya. Like a friend in a distant country! His blog has some 16.000 hits per week. Ten times more than mine! But there is also a weekly service, provided by Jaspert Slob, once a lecturer at a theological seminary in Indonesia (Manado, 1976-1983) and between 2005-2010 (more or less so) animator for Muslim-Christian encounter in Salatiga, together with his wife Josien Folbert.
Jaspert sends every week two emails to a circle of friends about what is going on in Indonesia, especially related to religious and socsial development. It is raw material, taken from newspaper and magazines. Much from the internet. It is usually bad news, because most news is about problems that yet have to be solved. Below I give a summary of the sending of last Saturday, week 6 of 2017, early February 2016. I gave it the title of The seven plagues of Indonesia. This week the series counts 27 pages, besides the summary of one page only
1. Papua. Jaspert is very much involved in the fate of this most eastern part of Indonesia. He reports about a 'Day of memory' in the Netherlands, Amersfoort, where some 100 people came together, to discuss human right abuses.
2. Terrorism. Coordinating Minister for safety/law and order wants to extend law 15/2003 against terrorism. He proposes that anything said or done against the unity of Indonesia must be seen as terrorism. Vague definitions are very dangerous and do not really help. A democratic society also needs criticism.
3. Poso. Actual terrorism is still around in Poso. A police officer was shot close to the town of poso, while terrorists still have a base in the forest of this region.
4. PKS is not only a political party, working in the democratic system, but also an activist organization seeking to reach its goal of an Islamic society through any means, mostly through small cells.
5. RUU, there is a proposal for the bill on the protection of religious life (the new formulation for the old Bill on Religious Harmony): rancangan Undang-undang Perlindungan Hidup Beragama. Lukman Hakim has formulated here five problems: a) what about the religious groups outside the big six? allow? ban? b) how to regulate religious propaganda, directed to people outside one's own group? c) building permits for houses of worship; 4. internal definition of doctrines in the big religions; e) FKUB, the formal encounter of religions at the level of provinces, districts and sub-districts.
6. Dissidents like the mayor of Bogor who fights a court decision allowing the building of a church, but supports and attends the opening of a new office of Hizbut Tahrir, an organization that does not recognize the Indonesian State.
7. Corruption. Realistic goals are often forgotten and covered by empty slogans. One of these is about Manokwari as the City of the Gospel, but it is dangerous due to drunkenness. Further political parties: there is much wrong in GOLKAR, the party of the vice-president Yusuf Kalla, but also the president, Jokowi, only pays lip-service to the fight against corruption.
Jaspert sends every week two emails to a circle of friends about what is going on in Indonesia, especially related to religious and socsial development. It is raw material, taken from newspaper and magazines. Much from the internet. It is usually bad news, because most news is about problems that yet have to be solved. Below I give a summary of the sending of last Saturday, week 6 of 2017, early February 2016. I gave it the title of The seven plagues of Indonesia. This week the series counts 27 pages, besides the summary of one page only
1. Papua. Jaspert is very much involved in the fate of this most eastern part of Indonesia. He reports about a 'Day of memory' in the Netherlands, Amersfoort, where some 100 people came together, to discuss human right abuses.
2. Terrorism. Coordinating Minister for safety/law and order wants to extend law 15/2003 against terrorism. He proposes that anything said or done against the unity of Indonesia must be seen as terrorism. Vague definitions are very dangerous and do not really help. A democratic society also needs criticism.
3. Poso. Actual terrorism is still around in Poso. A police officer was shot close to the town of poso, while terrorists still have a base in the forest of this region.
4. PKS is not only a political party, working in the democratic system, but also an activist organization seeking to reach its goal of an Islamic society through any means, mostly through small cells.
5. RUU, there is a proposal for the bill on the protection of religious life (the new formulation for the old Bill on Religious Harmony): rancangan Undang-undang Perlindungan Hidup Beragama. Lukman Hakim has formulated here five problems: a) what about the religious groups outside the big six? allow? ban? b) how to regulate religious propaganda, directed to people outside one's own group? c) building permits for houses of worship; 4. internal definition of doctrines in the big religions; e) FKUB, the formal encounter of religions at the level of provinces, districts and sub-districts.
6. Dissidents like the mayor of Bogor who fights a court decision allowing the building of a church, but supports and attends the opening of a new office of Hizbut Tahrir, an organization that does not recognize the Indonesian State.
7. Corruption. Realistic goals are often forgotten and covered by empty slogans. One of these is about Manokwari as the City of the Gospel, but it is dangerous due to drunkenness. Further political parties: there is much wrong in GOLKAR, the party of the vice-president Yusuf Kalla, but also the president, Jokowi, only pays lip-service to the fight against corruption.
zondag 31 januari 2016
The philosophical discourse of Franz Magnis Suseno
On 21 Jnauary this year I wrote on the chapter in a book by Heinz Schütte, Dialog, Kritik, Mission. Franz Magnis-Suseno, ein indonesischer Jesuit aus Detschland (Berlin: Regiospectra, 2013). Now I have read much more in this rich book and it a rich contribution to the biography of the most influential Catholic priest in the country after Mangunwijaya. It is a little bit strange that after Indonesians like Soegijopranoto and Mangun, now a German-born receives so much attention, but it may be a sign for the openness of Indonesian society.
Schütte (born 1937, social science, much experience in East Asia, especially Vietnam, lives now in Paris) was commissioned by the Goethe Institut of Jakarta to write this book. His special source were about 1000 letters of Magnis to his family (most to his mother), German writings of Magnis and interviews. In 29 chapters and 445 pages he gives a quite detailed image of Franz Magnis, from his turbulent youth: rich in Silezia, poor in relatively 1946 West Germany (the family still owned two houses a chapel and 130 hectares of land), education with Jesuits in Sankt Blasius and Pullach, Gymnasium and Philosophy), 29 January 1961 arrival in Jakarta. The 1960s were dedicated to study: Giri Sonta for Javanese, Kanisius College in Jakarta as a teacher, 1964-8 study of theology in Yogyakarta. In 1969 he was a first professor of in the Driyarkara School of Philosophy with eight Jesuits students (213)
It was quite a decision the beginning of Driyarkara. Back from Yogyakarta where the major seminary had begun in the 1930s, because that was the centre of javanese culture, far away from colonial politics. But in 1969 Jakarta was becoming political and cultural centre.
Chapter XII is on the 30 September events seen from Yogyakarta. In letters to Germany he gives some details about the feeling of liberation from Communism: erlösende Befreiung (134), with the Catholics students as the front soldiers against that evil Speerspitzei! P. 138-140 has a short image of the former Australian Baptist missionary Clive Williams, who became English teacher to Soeharto and lived close to his house in Jalana Cendaa later (much more on Clie Williams in the Shades of Grey by Jusuf Wanandi). This section also tells about the enormous increase in conversions in the later 1960s. But also support for prisoners, sometimes in a minimal way: just hear confession to people who later were taken to the execution (144)
Between 1971-4 took his PhD in Munich. In fact he began in October 1971 and finished the first draft of his thesis in May 1973. It was a continuation of his fascination for the young philosopher Karl Marx: the exploited classes, in order to let themselves be exploited, have to be sufficiently oppressed (246).
Returning to Jakarta he was happy to see two more philosophical centres: Harun Nasution at the Islamic University (still IAIN at the time) and Takdir Alisjahbana at UI (209).
In 1981 Magnis published a book in German, which was translated in 1984 in Javanese. It is about Javanese Ethics (or in German: Javanese Wisdom and Ethics). At that time I was teaching at the Islamic institutions in Jakarta and later Yogyakarta. I regretted that he acknowledged with Koentjaraningrat and Geertz that there are wo subcultures in Java: Islamic and 'Javanese' (in fact abangan. Heconcentrated not on the Islamic stream, but on the Javanese. That was the general Jesuit strategy: not Malay and Islamic, but pure Javanese as long as possible. In the 1993 of my book Duch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam (Amsterdam: Rodopi 1994: 147) I wrote about the Jesuits Jan Bakker, Franz Magnis and J.B. Banawiratma that "Again and again Javanism is cited as partner in dialogue, while Islam is not considered as a proper or even a possible candidate." This was then read by Nurcholis Madjid, who prepared his return to Indonesia and used in the polemic. I was at the time already teaching courses of Western approach to Islam and preparing what later became the four books on the common reading of the religious past by Muslims and Christians: the books on Adam and Jesus, the commentary on Juz 'Amma and the commentary on Surat Baqara.
In retrospect I have to correct my statements of 1993: Magnis took not the difficult path of formal Islamic doctrine, but the common interest in philosophical thinking and practical ethical discourse. That is not only an easier path, it is also more productive.
Mucvh more could be said from this rich book about this inspiring personality. In quite a few places Jusuf Wanandi, besides father Beek is described as too close to Soeharto. Page 274 writes that in 1981 fellow Jesuit Johannes Müller was expelled from Indonesia because of too open criticism of the Soeharto regime. Müller has, with Banawiratma, been teaching ion Yogyakarta. Magnis was not so direct (at that time, now he is open in opinions about MUI, Jokowi, but nevertheless received this great award in 2015). Fellow Jesuit Baskara Wardaya is also quoted on page 274: 'One of the great merits of Magnis is that he saved the Catholics from a too close identification with the Wanandi brothers, with Beek and CSIS'.
Schütte (born 1937, social science, much experience in East Asia, especially Vietnam, lives now in Paris) was commissioned by the Goethe Institut of Jakarta to write this book. His special source were about 1000 letters of Magnis to his family (most to his mother), German writings of Magnis and interviews. In 29 chapters and 445 pages he gives a quite detailed image of Franz Magnis, from his turbulent youth: rich in Silezia, poor in relatively 1946 West Germany (the family still owned two houses a chapel and 130 hectares of land), education with Jesuits in Sankt Blasius and Pullach, Gymnasium and Philosophy), 29 January 1961 arrival in Jakarta. The 1960s were dedicated to study: Giri Sonta for Javanese, Kanisius College in Jakarta as a teacher, 1964-8 study of theology in Yogyakarta. In 1969 he was a first professor of in the Driyarkara School of Philosophy with eight Jesuits students (213)
It was quite a decision the beginning of Driyarkara. Back from Yogyakarta where the major seminary had begun in the 1930s, because that was the centre of javanese culture, far away from colonial politics. But in 1969 Jakarta was becoming political and cultural centre.
Chapter XII is on the 30 September events seen from Yogyakarta. In letters to Germany he gives some details about the feeling of liberation from Communism: erlösende Befreiung (134), with the Catholics students as the front soldiers against that evil Speerspitzei! P. 138-140 has a short image of the former Australian Baptist missionary Clive Williams, who became English teacher to Soeharto and lived close to his house in Jalana Cendaa later (much more on Clie Williams in the Shades of Grey by Jusuf Wanandi). This section also tells about the enormous increase in conversions in the later 1960s. But also support for prisoners, sometimes in a minimal way: just hear confession to people who later were taken to the execution (144)
Between 1971-4 took his PhD in Munich. In fact he began in October 1971 and finished the first draft of his thesis in May 1973. It was a continuation of his fascination for the young philosopher Karl Marx: the exploited classes, in order to let themselves be exploited, have to be sufficiently oppressed (246).
Returning to Jakarta he was happy to see two more philosophical centres: Harun Nasution at the Islamic University (still IAIN at the time) and Takdir Alisjahbana at UI (209).
In 1981 Magnis published a book in German, which was translated in 1984 in Javanese. It is about Javanese Ethics (or in German: Javanese Wisdom and Ethics). At that time I was teaching at the Islamic institutions in Jakarta and later Yogyakarta. I regretted that he acknowledged with Koentjaraningrat and Geertz that there are wo subcultures in Java: Islamic and 'Javanese' (in fact abangan. Heconcentrated not on the Islamic stream, but on the Javanese. That was the general Jesuit strategy: not Malay and Islamic, but pure Javanese as long as possible. In the 1993 of my book Duch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam (Amsterdam: Rodopi 1994: 147) I wrote about the Jesuits Jan Bakker, Franz Magnis and J.B. Banawiratma that "Again and again Javanism is cited as partner in dialogue, while Islam is not considered as a proper or even a possible candidate." This was then read by Nurcholis Madjid, who prepared his return to Indonesia and used in the polemic. I was at the time already teaching courses of Western approach to Islam and preparing what later became the four books on the common reading of the religious past by Muslims and Christians: the books on Adam and Jesus, the commentary on Juz 'Amma and the commentary on Surat Baqara.
In retrospect I have to correct my statements of 1993: Magnis took not the difficult path of formal Islamic doctrine, but the common interest in philosophical thinking and practical ethical discourse. That is not only an easier path, it is also more productive.
Mucvh more could be said from this rich book about this inspiring personality. In quite a few places Jusuf Wanandi, besides father Beek is described as too close to Soeharto. Page 274 writes that in 1981 fellow Jesuit Johannes Müller was expelled from Indonesia because of too open criticism of the Soeharto regime. Müller has, with Banawiratma, been teaching ion Yogyakarta. Magnis was not so direct (at that time, now he is open in opinions about MUI, Jokowi, but nevertheless received this great award in 2015). Fellow Jesuit Baskara Wardaya is also quoted on page 274: 'One of the great merits of Magnis is that he saved the Catholics from a too close identification with the Wanandi brothers, with Beek and CSIS'.
dinsdag 26 januari 2016
The four problems/mistakes of Jusuf Wanandi
Last weeks I have read some material about father Joseph/Joop Beek SJ. More an image grew that he was strong in setting things in working, but could not really finish it. He was the founder of Realino in Yogyakarta. He developed a Documentation Office for the Catholic bishops, but it was later grown into something absolutely different: policy debating club CSIS, a think tank for the conservative and authoritarian Soeharto government.
Jusuf Wanandi was one of the three Chinese Indonesian Catholics who worked in this field, together with his brother Sofjan (specialist in organizing and managing money, from the family and from sponsors) and Harry Than Silalahi, great in vision and strategy.
Jusuf Wanandi published in 2012 a fascinating book: Shades of Grey. A political memoir of modern Indonesia 1865-1998. It is not triumphalist. It is not all black or white. At least on four aspects Wanandi regrets his struggle from the early 1960s, fighting against Communism, until in the eriod of Reformasi.
In the fight against Communism General Soeharto was a key figure. He worked often slower than wanted by the students. He made always small steps, was often hesitating, was careful to keep control of everything. But finally he had too much power. From Supersemar in March 1966 to its confrimation: Page 65: We know now, looking back, that we were wrong to support this move, and would never do it again. It gave too much power to one man. But it was a struggle at that time. We were inexperienced. It resulted in too much corruption, a father who could not constrain his children (Wanandi is rather forgiving and positieve about Ibu Tien).
11 November 1965 there was a meeting of some Catholics with Sukarno: Kasimo, Frans Seda, Harry Tjan. They called for an intervention with the killings. Sukarno answered: This is a political problem. I'll handle it. But Sarwo Edhie continued, mostly because his spiritual father, General Yani was killed. And Yani had come from the same town of Purworedjo. Is this not soo simple? Blaming Edhie only? What about strategy of the arnmy in general, already at the time?
Winning back Papua is a nationalist title. Soeharto was in the active army in 1962-3 and therefore deserved to conclude the process in a positive way. Wanandi came to Papua in May 1967 and was critical: West Papua had been completely neglected since it was returned in early 1963 .. the whole region had been plundered by our Armed Forces. (99) I was wondering how this man already in 1967 knew that the army was not respecting the rights of citizens and still worked together with the army for so long.
The Act of Free Choice is here depicted as something that was inevitable.
A further weak sectin is about East Timor. Here agin the army took action, while Wanandi and CSIS members travelled around the world to gather documentation and support for Indonesia. And in fact they perhaps only worked as the polite, educated and reasonable side of Indonesia. In fact, the Americans had no interest at all in East Timor itself. They were only afraid of Communism.
It is a very Catholic book, although no priest or bishop is mentioned here. Father Beek is missing as well! No word about him. Also nothing about Mangunwijaya, Magnis Suseno, no bishop Belo and his Nobel Prize
Reading this book gives us a very selective history of the Soeharto period from a political Catholic group: they were anti-Communist because they were Catholic. But in a positieve way? No new formulation of Pancasila Doctrine (like Mangun wanted with more interest on social justice and true democracy, not only the focus on the One Divinity).
It is very negative about Proetstants: no organisation, no unity.
On pp 79-80 he gives a plea for a Truth and Reconciliation Process, resuming the terrible killings of 1965-6. Abdurrahman Wahid should have done it, because he had the spiritual rpestige like South African Nelson Mandela. But he had no political support. (79-80)
The book is a sometimes honest, sometimes deceiving picture of a long reign.
Jusuf Wanandi was one of the three Chinese Indonesian Catholics who worked in this field, together with his brother Sofjan (specialist in organizing and managing money, from the family and from sponsors) and Harry Than Silalahi, great in vision and strategy.
Jusuf Wanandi published in 2012 a fascinating book: Shades of Grey. A political memoir of modern Indonesia 1865-1998. It is not triumphalist. It is not all black or white. At least on four aspects Wanandi regrets his struggle from the early 1960s, fighting against Communism, until in the eriod of Reformasi.
In the fight against Communism General Soeharto was a key figure. He worked often slower than wanted by the students. He made always small steps, was often hesitating, was careful to keep control of everything. But finally he had too much power. From Supersemar in March 1966 to its confrimation: Page 65: We know now, looking back, that we were wrong to support this move, and would never do it again. It gave too much power to one man. But it was a struggle at that time. We were inexperienced. It resulted in too much corruption, a father who could not constrain his children (Wanandi is rather forgiving and positieve about Ibu Tien).
11 November 1965 there was a meeting of some Catholics with Sukarno: Kasimo, Frans Seda, Harry Tjan. They called for an intervention with the killings. Sukarno answered: This is a political problem. I'll handle it. But Sarwo Edhie continued, mostly because his spiritual father, General Yani was killed. And Yani had come from the same town of Purworedjo. Is this not soo simple? Blaming Edhie only? What about strategy of the arnmy in general, already at the time?
Winning back Papua is a nationalist title. Soeharto was in the active army in 1962-3 and therefore deserved to conclude the process in a positive way. Wanandi came to Papua in May 1967 and was critical: West Papua had been completely neglected since it was returned in early 1963 .. the whole region had been plundered by our Armed Forces. (99) I was wondering how this man already in 1967 knew that the army was not respecting the rights of citizens and still worked together with the army for so long.
Left is Golkar politican Jusuf Kalla, right Jusuf Wanandi
The Act of Free Choice is here depicted as something that was inevitable.
A further weak sectin is about East Timor. Here agin the army took action, while Wanandi and CSIS members travelled around the world to gather documentation and support for Indonesia. And in fact they perhaps only worked as the polite, educated and reasonable side of Indonesia. In fact, the Americans had no interest at all in East Timor itself. They were only afraid of Communism.
It is a very Catholic book, although no priest or bishop is mentioned here. Father Beek is missing as well! No word about him. Also nothing about Mangunwijaya, Magnis Suseno, no bishop Belo and his Nobel Prize
Reading this book gives us a very selective history of the Soeharto period from a political Catholic group: they were anti-Communist because they were Catholic. But in a positieve way? No new formulation of Pancasila Doctrine (like Mangun wanted with more interest on social justice and true democracy, not only the focus on the One Divinity).
It is very negative about Proetstants: no organisation, no unity.
On pp 79-80 he gives a plea for a Truth and Reconciliation Process, resuming the terrible killings of 1965-6. Abdurrahman Wahid should have done it, because he had the spiritual rpestige like South African Nelson Mandela. But he had no political support. (79-80)
The book is a sometimes honest, sometimes deceiving picture of a long reign.
vrijdag 22 januari 2016
Khadija Arib, Speaker of Dutch Parliament
Khadija Arib was born in Morocco 1960. Until the age of 15 she lived in Casablanca when she joined her illiterate mother to the Netherlands where her father had found a job as a migrant worker. She had received a simple but decent education in Morocco, could speak, read and write Arabic and French and finished high school in the Netherlands. She studied social and political science at college and university. Worked for some time at a university, then at institutes for social wellfare and became a member of parliament for the Labout-Socialist Party in 1998.
Last week a new speaker for the House of Representatives (the most important 2d chamber of Dutch Parliament) was elected. It was a race between four candidates. There were four cadidates. The cadidate for the anti-Muslim party of Geert Wilders only received votes from his own party. This party strongly attacked Khadija Arib, because she holds a Dutch and a Moroccan citizenship. 'How can a Moroccan citizen become speaker of Dutch parliament?' Besides being a Muslim she was criticised by this party. But this had no effect, instead the Wilders-candidate could not attract votes from other parties. Also the candidate from the Christian Democrats was not strong enough.
In the last votes there were two candidates: Khadija Arib against the candidate from the Liberal Party. Wilders did not support both and with about 55-85 Arib was the strongest and was elected.
This election reminded me of the funny book by Michel Houellebecq, Soumission (Submission as the translation of Islam), where from four candidates in 2022 the final vote is between an anti-Islamic nationalist candidate and a liberal Muslim and the latter becomes president!
Arib has written several small books. One, Couscous op zondag (2009) is her personal and family story. A second, Allah heeft ons zo gemaakt. Liefde tussen vrouwen (Allah has made us this way. About love between women, 2011) is a defence for the acceptance of homosexuality. Arib is herself married a man, a medical doctor. But she had a grandmother who was an illiterate but practical and open minded woman. She discovered that a granddaughter had a lesbian relation and could accept it. In the book Arib has interviews with four lesbian women from Morocco (2), Egypt and Iraq. Only in a last note she claims that homosexuality is not forbidden by the Qur'an (the story of Luth is not about this practice), nor in hadith. But religion has not the proper answers here. 'Arab spring is not only about political change, it is also about individual freedom, control and authority over one's own life' (p. 71)
Last week a new speaker for the House of Representatives (the most important 2d chamber of Dutch Parliament) was elected. It was a race between four candidates. There were four cadidates. The cadidate for the anti-Muslim party of Geert Wilders only received votes from his own party. This party strongly attacked Khadija Arib, because she holds a Dutch and a Moroccan citizenship. 'How can a Moroccan citizen become speaker of Dutch parliament?' Besides being a Muslim she was criticised by this party. But this had no effect, instead the Wilders-candidate could not attract votes from other parties. Also the candidate from the Christian Democrats was not strong enough.
In the last votes there were two candidates: Khadija Arib against the candidate from the Liberal Party. Wilders did not support both and with about 55-85 Arib was the strongest and was elected.
This election reminded me of the funny book by Michel Houellebecq, Soumission (Submission as the translation of Islam), where from four candidates in 2022 the final vote is between an anti-Islamic nationalist candidate and a liberal Muslim and the latter becomes president!
Arib has written several small books. One, Couscous op zondag (2009) is her personal and family story. A second, Allah heeft ons zo gemaakt. Liefde tussen vrouwen (Allah has made us this way. About love between women, 2011) is a defence for the acceptance of homosexuality. Arib is herself married a man, a medical doctor. But she had a grandmother who was an illiterate but practical and open minded woman. She discovered that a granddaughter had a lesbian relation and could accept it. In the book Arib has interviews with four lesbian women from Morocco (2), Egypt and Iraq. Only in a last note she claims that homosexuality is not forbidden by the Qur'an (the story of Luth is not about this practice), nor in hadith. But religion has not the proper answers here. 'Arab spring is not only about political change, it is also about individual freedom, control and authority over one's own life' (p. 71)
donderdag 21 januari 2016
Bob Santamaria and Joop Beek
In a book, written in German about the Jesuit priest Franz [von] Magnis-Suseno, its author Heinz Schütte has included a chapter on Joop/Josephus Beek. He has the story of Beek as the founder of Realino in the 1950s. In 1959 he moved to Jakarta where he trained Catholic students to become political activists against Communism. They started in the Jesuit compound of Jalan Gunung Sahari 88 a documentation centre and Beek sent regular reports about the politcal-social situation to his Catholic network. Schütte also gives a summary of section of a book by Frank Mount, Wrestling with Asia (2012). Mount concentrates on the Movement of the Australian Bob Santamaria. In the 1930s his dream was that Australia would become a Christian country, but after 1950 he became very active in fighting Communism, first of all in Vietnam, but he had also connections to Indonesia, especially with Jesuit Joop Beek. I did not see the book by Frank Mount (there is according to the Worldcat no copy in Europe, just one in Cornell and further in Australia only!) but rely on summaries from reviews on the Internet and the book by Heinz Schütte, Dialog, Kritik, Mission. Franz Magnis-Suseno, ein indonesischer Jesuit aus Deutschland Berlin; Regiospectra, 2013; chapter 13 is on Pater Josephus Beek SJ, 151-176).
Frank Mount tells that Father Beek had a similar network to the one by Bob Santamaria. "Having got word of the coup, Beek toldSantamaria who in turn informed Australia's security organisations before the coup happened.' According to Frank Mount 'many, many thousands of dollars' were sent to Indonesia through Joop Beek (Schütte, p. 160). The money came from Australia and the USA. Beek wrote regular secret information bulleting to his network, called 'social justice organisations' (p. 161). The documentation centre, established by Beek in the early 1960s and staffed by people like Harry Tjan Silalahi and Jusuf Wanandi.
Picture above, left is rightwing, anti Communist journalist Frank Mount, right Bob Santamaria, South-Vietnamese Tran Van Lan in the centre.
In another book, the political autobiography of Jusuf Wanandi, Shades of Grey. A Political Memoir of Modern Indonesia 1965-1998, Jakarta/Singapore, Equinox, 2012, nothing is said about Joop Beek, although 'an older Jesuit stated that Beek had made Wanandi' (Schütte 162). Schütte quotes Mount in a Wanandi statement from 1970: What we and Beek's Bureau are working for is that in ten to fifteen years we, the civilians, through the Functional Groups, will be able to take over from the Army. In the meantime, we have to support the Army and work for change and restrain the present political parties.
In Aad van den Heuvel's (a Dutch journalist, TV programmes and books on Beek) words: Beek was the player who manipulated the Wayang puppets. From a distance in time it may also have been the opposite. It was the smiling general Soeharto who made use of the Catholic and Muslims students with Harry Tjan, Jusuf Wanandi and Cosmas Batubara on the Catholic side, Subchan with the Muslims of NU. In retrospect Jusuf Wanandi in his energetic and short style acknowledges: We now know, looking back, that we were wrong to support this move [MPRS decision of June 1966] and would never do it again. It gave too much power to one man. But it was a struggle at that time. We were inexperienced (Wanandi, p. 65). Beek and his students may have been thinking that they could manage the process, but looking back they had to be satisfied with the spectators' role. Anyhow, they could make also good profit from this position.
Schütte writes that Harry Tjan still considers Beek as his great teacher, although Magnis estimates that Beek was wrong in his analysis of the situation: Communists are not per se the great enemy, nor are Muslims so (as Beek analysed after 1967; see Schütte, 169).
Frank Mount tells that Father Beek had a similar network to the one by Bob Santamaria. "Having got word of the coup, Beek toldSantamaria who in turn informed Australia's security organisations before the coup happened.' According to Frank Mount 'many, many thousands of dollars' were sent to Indonesia through Joop Beek (Schütte, p. 160). The money came from Australia and the USA. Beek wrote regular secret information bulleting to his network, called 'social justice organisations' (p. 161). The documentation centre, established by Beek in the early 1960s and staffed by people like Harry Tjan Silalahi and Jusuf Wanandi.
Picture above, left is rightwing, anti Communist journalist Frank Mount, right Bob Santamaria, South-Vietnamese Tran Van Lan in the centre.
In another book, the political autobiography of Jusuf Wanandi, Shades of Grey. A Political Memoir of Modern Indonesia 1965-1998, Jakarta/Singapore, Equinox, 2012, nothing is said about Joop Beek, although 'an older Jesuit stated that Beek had made Wanandi' (Schütte 162). Schütte quotes Mount in a Wanandi statement from 1970: What we and Beek's Bureau are working for is that in ten to fifteen years we, the civilians, through the Functional Groups, will be able to take over from the Army. In the meantime, we have to support the Army and work for change and restrain the present political parties.
In Aad van den Heuvel's (a Dutch journalist, TV programmes and books on Beek) words: Beek was the player who manipulated the Wayang puppets. From a distance in time it may also have been the opposite. It was the smiling general Soeharto who made use of the Catholic and Muslims students with Harry Tjan, Jusuf Wanandi and Cosmas Batubara on the Catholic side, Subchan with the Muslims of NU. In retrospect Jusuf Wanandi in his energetic and short style acknowledges: We now know, looking back, that we were wrong to support this move [MPRS decision of June 1966] and would never do it again. It gave too much power to one man. But it was a struggle at that time. We were inexperienced (Wanandi, p. 65). Beek and his students may have been thinking that they could manage the process, but looking back they had to be satisfied with the spectators' role. Anyhow, they could make also good profit from this position.
Schütte writes that Harry Tjan still considers Beek as his great teacher, although Magnis estimates that Beek was wrong in his analysis of the situation: Communists are not per se the great enemy, nor are Muslims so (as Beek analysed after 1967; see Schütte, 169).
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